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INTRODUCTION 
When one thinks about discrimination, blatant acts or bad motives 
usually come to mind.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (―Title 
VII‖) protects against this type of intentional discrimination in the 
workplace through its disparate treatment provision.
1
  Title VII also, 
however, imposes liability even in situations where the employer acts 
without bad intentions.
2
  An employer may be liable simply because one 
group passes a neutral promotion test or meets a hiring qualification at a 
substantially higher rate than other groups, even when the selection 
criterion applies to everyone and is not devised to disadvantage one group 
over another.
3
  Nevertheless, if an employer‘s neutral employment practice 
causes a disproportionate impact on a racial group or other protected class, 
it is a prima facie violation of Title VII‘s disparate impact provision.4  The 
employer must defend the charge by showing that the employment practice 
is job related and a business necessity.
5
  Mounting a defense may involve 
                                                 
 1. Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
provide protections against employment discrimination by providing as follows:   
(a) Employer Practices.  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employments, because of such individual‘s race, color, 
religion, sex,  or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.   
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that even good 
intentions are not a defense when an employer‘s selection criteria that are not job related 
cause an adverse effect).   
 3. See id. at 431–32 (discussing the lack of discriminatory intent in designing tests or 
criteria for promotion). 
 4. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).   
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(ii); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
  
validating the test or selection criterion, which can cost $100,000–
$400,000.
6
  Even after an employer validates a business practice, the 
employer may still be liable if there are other equally effective alternatives 
that have less adverse effect.
7
 
Consequently, the employer may be concerned about the racial 
composition of its employees and may make race-conscious employment 
decisions to avoid disparate impact liability.  To the extent that employers 
feel induced by the disparate impact provision to make such decisions, it is 
possible that the provision violates the Equal Protection Clause because it 
encourages employers to act on the basis of race.  
In Ricci v. DeStefano,
8
 the city of New Haven faced this very 
predicament and decided to void a promotion test given to firefighters 
because it was concerned about disparate impact liability.
9
  A 
disproportionate number of African Americans and Hispanics who took the 
test failed.
10
  Under the four-fifths rule, a Guideline enforced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖), disparate impact exists 
when the selection or pass rate of one group is less than eighty percent of 
the most successful group.
11
  Had the minority firefighters sued, they would 
have been able to show a prima facie case of disparate impact based simply 
on the numbers.
12
  This potential litigation led the city to discard the test 
results.
13
  Consequently, Caucasian firefighters and a Hispanic firefighter 
who passed the test, and would likely have been promoted, sued.
14
  These 
plaintiffs alleged that the city‘s action violated Title VII‘s disparate 
treatment provision and the Equal Protection Clause.
15
 
In Ricci, the Court resolved the disparate treatment issue under Title 
VII
16
 but did not address whether the disparate impact provision violates 
the Equal Protection Clause.
17
  Justice Scalia observed that the Supreme 
                                                 
 6. See infra note 164 (discussing costs of validating selection criteria).  
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 8. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 2664. 
 10. Id. at 2677–78. 
 11. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(2010). 
 12. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677–78.  On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for each 
racial group was the following:  58.1 percent for Caucasians, 31.6 percent for African 
Americans, and 20 percent for Hispanics.  Id. at 2678.  On the captain examination, the pass 
rate for Caucasians was 64 percent and for Hispanics and African Americans was 37.5 
percent.  Id. 
 13. Id. at 2664. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2681 (holding that the city needed to show a ―strong basis in evidence‖ that its 
selection process would cause a potential disparate impact violation, which the city lacked).  
 17. The Court stated: 
  
Court‘s resolution ―merely postpone[d] the evil day on which the Court 
will have to confront the question:  Whether, or to what extent, are the 
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
consistent with the Constitution‘s guarantee of equal protection?  The 
question is not an easy one.‖18   
This Article completes the initial inquiry I embarked upon to answer this 
difficult question.
19
  In my prior work, I identified and examined six 
compelling interests that might be asserted to justify the disparate impact 
provision‘s racial classifications under an Equal Protection Clause 
challenge:  remedying past discrimination, smoking out discrimination 
(intentional or unconscious), obtaining the benefits of diversity, providing 
role models, satisfying an operational need, and providing equal 
employment opportunity by removing barriers.
20
  I concluded that 
removing barriers to employment might provide the strongest defense for 
the disparate impact provision.
21
  This Article will explore whether the 
disparate impact provision‘s use of racial classifications is narrowly 
tailored to achieve these compelling interests.  Although Title VII protects 
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, this Article focuses on racial classifications, and a 
discussion of other groups is beyond its scope. 
Commentators have focused on other constitutional issues raised by the 
disparate impact provision,
22
 but none have explored this particular 
constitutional inquiry—whether the disparate impact provision is narrowly 
tailored to pass strict scrutiny should ―the evil day‖ come when an Equal 
                                                 
Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken 
here in purported compliance with Title VII.  We also do not hold that meeting the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a 
future case.  As we explain below, because respondents have not met their burden 
under Title VII, we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is 
ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.   
Id. at 2676. 
 18. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 19. See Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII‘s Disparate Impact Provision 
and the Equal Protection Clause:  Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 8(2010). 
 20. See id. at 8–9. 
 21. See id. at 88 (discussing the removal of barriers as a compelling interest because it 
affords people economic liberty and equality).  
 22. Much scholarship has been written about the validity of laws that prohibit disparate 
impact, without a showing of intent, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Commerce Clause, and about whether neutral state action that has a discriminatory effect 
but lacks a discriminatory intent violates the Equal Protection Clause.  The latter point was 
raised by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235, 237, 238–39 (1976).  See Richard A. 
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 
494–95 (2003) (discussing the Court‘s treatment of statutory disparate impact standards in 
Washington v. Davis).   
  
Protection Clause challenge is made.  In fact, little scholarship has been 
written about narrow tailoring generally.
23
 
It is surprising that there is a dearth of scholarship discussing narrow 
tailoring given its significance in the evaluation of governmental actions 
that affect equal protection and individual rights.
24
  It is said that strict 
scrutiny is ―‗strict‘ in theory and fatal in fact,‖25 but a review of the 
Supreme Court‘s equal protection cases reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny 
is fatal because of narrow tailoring.  When governmental use of racial 
classifications is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, strict 
scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling purpose and that 
the racial classifications be narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.
26
  
The asserted governmental purpose may either be remedial (to remedy past 
discrimination) or nonremedial (for some purpose other than to remedy 
past discrimination).  The narrow tailoring requirement has been 
particularly fatal in cases involving nonremedial interests.  Korematsu v. 
United States
27
 and Grutter v. Bollinger
28
 are among the few cases 
involving nonremedial interests to survive strict scrutiny‘s requirement for 
narrow tailoring, but in light of the universal condemnation of Korematsu,
29
 
Grutter is the more viable example.  
This Article explores whether the disparate impact provision can survive 
strict scrutiny‘s narrow tailoring requirement by examining the factors 
                                                 
 23. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don‘t Tell, Don‘t Ask:  Narrow Tailoring After 
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (discussing how Grutter v. Bollinger 
and Gratz v. Bollinger changed the narrow tailoring analysis); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1996) (considering the types of affirmative action programs 
that would pass the narrow tailoring requirement). 
 24. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (establishing that 
local, state, or federal government action that implicates rights bestowed by the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause will be 
reviewed with strict scrutiny). 
 25. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 26. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (invoking national security concerns for the government‘s 
racial classifications during the internment of Japanese Americans). 
 28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (invoking an interest in diversity for the law school‘s race-
conscious admissions program). 
 29. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―[T]he 
Court . . . nonetheless yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification. . . 
. Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks as prohibited.‖); Farag 
v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (―[Korematsu] is now widely 
regarded as a black mark on our constitutional jurisprudence.‖); Jonathan M. Justl, Note, 
Disastrously Misunderstood:  Judicial Deference in the Japanese-American Cases, 119 
YALE L.J. 270, 278 n.34 (2009) (citing David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
993 (2002)) (pointing out that by 2002, eight Supreme Court Justices have stated that 
Korematsu was incorrectly decided).  
  
considered by the Court in evaluating this requirement.
30
  This Article 
begins by briefly tracing the development of the disparate impact provision 
and the four-fifths rule in Part I and explaining how the two are related.  
Part II discusses the significance of narrow tailoring and the factors used to 
evaluate whether the narrowly tailored requirement is met. 
In Part III, this Article examines the first factor:  whether the 
enforcement of the four-fifths rule operates like a quota and draws a line on 
the basis of race,
31
 or operates as a permissible goal, like in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.  Part III also considers whether Grutter‘s ―critical mass‖ 
approach, which did not refer to any specified number, is applicable to the 
disparate impact provision.
32
  This Part concludes that while the law school 
in Grutter may assess the attainment of diversity without reference to a 
defined number of minorities, the critical mass approach is inapplicable 
because the EEOC must refer to some sort of threshold to maintain 
uniformity in enforcing the disparate impact provision.  Additionally, the 
EEOC must refer to a predetermined number or ratio as to what constitutes 
disparate impact in order to provide notice and due process to employers.   
Part IV considers the factors of individualized consideration and 
flexibility.  If the disparate impact provision functions as a quota, it is 
unlikely to afford flexibility or individualized consideration.  Whether a 
race-conscious program is narrowly tailored is dependent upon whether 
race is used as the decisive factor and whether case-by-case considerations 
are possible. 
Part V examines the scope and duration of the disparate impact 
provision.  The reasonableness of a program‘s scope depends upon its 
ability to encompass only similarly situated persons for purposes of the 
program and may be affected by the overinclusion or underinclusion of 
people.  Part V discusses whether the disparate impact provision‘s 
probability for error would render it underinclusive or overinclusive and 
whether the provision excludes white males from asserting disparate impact 
claims, thereby making it underinclusive.  Part VI explores whether the 
provision‘s racial classifications are reasonable in duration or seek to 
maintain racial balance.   
                                                 
 30. I acknowledge that the application of the narrowly tailored requirement is fact 
specific, and this Article will explore the question using general facts derived from the 
Supreme Court‘s precedent.  This Article does not make a normative argument regarding 
whether the cases were rightly decided, but rather, accepts the Court‘s holdings as a basis 
for analysis.   
 31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (rejecting set-aside program because it was ―a line 
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status‖). 
 32. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (2003) (accepting the school‘s concept of ―critical 
mass‖ as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity). 
  
Part VII evaluates the final factor of whether the disparate impact 
provision‘s racial classifications are necessary after consideration of race-
neutral alternatives and whether there are race-neutral means to achieve the 
compelling purposes previously identified.  Part VIII assesses the 
likelihood of the disparate impact provision‘s survival, taking in 
consideration the totality of the narrow tailoring factors.  
This Article concludes that the disparate impact provision is unlikely to 
pass the narrowly tailored requirement and risks being invalidated on ―the 
evil day‖ when the provision is challenged under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY AND PROVISION AND 
THE FOUR-FIFTHS RULE 
A. The Beginnings of Disparate Impact Theory in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court first adopted the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.,
33
 in which the Court considered the breadth of Title VII‘s 
protection against discrimination.
34
  In Griggs, an employer required 
employees seeking jobs or promotions to have a high school diploma and 
to pass an intelligence test.
35
  These requirements were applied equally to 
Caucasians and African Americans
36
 but adversely affected African 
Americans.
37
  The Court invalidated the employer‘s practices, concluding 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited ―not only overt discrimination 
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.‖38  
Thus, employers who act with good or non-discriminatory intent must 
nevertheless justify employment practices that have an adverse effect by 
showing a business necessity related to job performance.
39
 
B. Congress‘s Passage of the Disparate Impact Provision 
After Griggs, Congress codified disparate impact liability in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 provides: 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter only if— 
                                                 
 33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 34. Id. at 430–31. 
 35. Id. at 427–28. 
 36. Id. at 429. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 431. 
 39. Id. 
  
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and 
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
40
 
Section 703(k)(1) encompasses the same principles of disparate impact 
articulated in Griggs by affording employers an opportunity to defend their 
employment practice by showing that the practice is job related and 
consistent with business necessity.
41 
  Additionally, § 703 provides 
plaintiffs an opportunity at the surrebuttal stage to show that the employer 
refused to use less adverse alternatives.
42 
  An employer‘s refusal to use 
such options will render it liable under the disparate impact provision, even 
if the employer‘s practice is job related and consistent with a business 
necessity.
43
 
C. The Four-Fifths Rule  
The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII.
44
  In 1978, the EEOC 
promulgated the four-fifths rule as part of its Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures
45
 that were designed to assist with compliance with 
federal law prohibiting discrimination and to ―provide a framework for 
determining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures.‖46  The 
four-fifths rule has become an important rule because a violation of the rule 
is a prima facie case of disparate impact.
47
  The four-fifths rule or eighty 
percent rule provides as follows: 
                                                 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
 41. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 42. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 43. Id. § 2000e-2(d)(1)(A). 
 44. Id. § 2000e-5(a). 
 45. Jacob Van Bowen, Jr. & C. Allen Riggins, A Technical Look at the Eighty Per Cent 
Rule as Applied to Employee Selection Procedures, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (1978). 
 46. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Federal Register 38290, 
38296 (Aug. 25, 1978).  
 47.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673, 2677–78 (2009)(―Under the 
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an 
employer uses ‗a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‘‖) (citing 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)).  The Supreme Court has stated that ―[u]less and until the defendant 
[employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by 
showing the stated elements‖ of disparate impact.  Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
2191, 2198 (2010).  The four-fifths rule is an articulation of when the stated elements of 
disparate impact has been met. 
  
Adverse impact and the ―four-fifths rule.‖  A selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty 
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be 
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse 
impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be 
regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse 
impact.
48
  
The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the Guidelines
49
 but has made 
varying statements regarding the deference it accords to the Guidelines 
generally.  Griggs accorded the Guidelines ―great deference,‖50 explaining 
that ―[s]ince the Act and its legislative history support the Commission‘s 
construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing 
the will of Congress.‖51  Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody52 followed the 
deference given in Griggs,
53
 opining that ―[t]he EEOC Guidelines are not 
administrative regulations[] promulgated pursuant to formal procedures 
established by the Congress.  But . . . they do constitute ‗[t]he 
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.‘‖54  
Additionally, in Ricci, the Court recognized the role of the Guidelines in 
implementing the disparate impact provision.
55
   
Since the promulgation of the four-fifths rule in 1978,
56
 the Supreme 
Court has not explicitly approved or rejected this particular rule.  The Court 
                                                 
 48. The four-fifths rule also considers situations in which a ratio higher or lower than 
four-fifths may constitute evidence of adverse impact.  EEOC Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). See Marion Gross Sobol & Charles J. 
Ellard, Measures of Employment Discrimination:  A Statistical Alternative to the Four-
Fifths Rule, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 381, 388–91 (1988) for an explanation of how to compute 
disparities using the four-fifths rule. 
 49. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:  An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1319 (1987). 
 50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). 
 51. Id. at 434.  
 52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 53. Id. at 431 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34); see also Dean Booth & James L. 
Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law,  
29 EMORY L.J. 121, 128 (1980) (stating that Albemarle ―represents the ‗high-water mark‘ of 
deference to the 1970 Guidelines‖). 
 54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)). 
 55. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (citing EEOC Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)(2008)) (applying the four-fifths 
rule).  Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated, ―Recognizing EEOC‘s ‗enforcement 
responsibilities‘ under Title VII, we have previously accorded the Commission‘s position 
respectful consideration.‖  Id. at 2699–700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The circuit courts, however, ―have accorded them a limited degree of deference.  The circuit 
courts have generally accepted the guidelines as expert advice on technical issues, but not as 
binding authority on questions of statutory interpretations.‖ Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 
1319. 
 56. Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 648.  In addition to the EEOC, the 
Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and the Department of Labor used the 
  
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
57
 viewed the four-fifths rule as ―not 
provid[ing] more than a rule of thumb for the courts.‖58  In United States v. 
Paradise,
59
 the Court did not directly endorse the four-fifths rule but 
acknowledged that the parties agreed to use the four-fifths rule to determine 
the adverse effect of the selection procedure.
60
  The Court also provided an 
illustration of the application of the four-fifths rule through an example.
61
   
In Connecticut v. Teal,
62
 the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the four-
fifths rule by recognizing the district court‘s uncontested finding that the 
examination failed the four-fifths rule.
63
  The Court provided a more direct 
discussion regarding the four-fifths rule in Ricci v. DeStefano, where the 
Court applied the rule and concluded that ―[t]he pass rates of minorities . . . 
fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the 
disparate-impact provision of Title VII.‖64 
Additionally, there is little agreement among commentators as to the 
deference that should be accorded to the Guidelines.  One commentator has 
argued ―Congress did not intend the courts to defer [to] the EEOC 
rulings.‖65  Congress empowered the EEOC to investigate charges of 
employer discrimination and determine whether a reasonable basis exists 
for the charges, but not to determine the existence of discrimination.
66
   
Another commentator, however, has concluded that the Guidelines 
should be viewed as ―more than informal.‖67  According to this view, the 
courts have erroneously interpreted the Guidelines as being entitled to 
deference but not binding.
68
  As the argument goes, this interpretation is a 
mistake because the EEOC promulgated the Guidelines with the 
participation of agencies empowered with substantive rulemaking 
                                                 
four-fifths rule to carry out their respective enforcement charges. Id. at  
648–49. 
 57. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 995 n.3. 
 59. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 60. Id. at 159. 
 61. Id. at 159 n.10 (―In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion 
test pass it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass.‖). 
 62. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 63. Id. at 444 n.4; Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood:  Statistics, 
Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 143 
(stating that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved the eighty percent rule when it 
noted that the petitioners did not contest the lower court‘s finding of disparate impact). 
 64. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009).  
 65. Michael Evan Gold, Griggs‘ Folly:  An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin 
of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for 
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 485 (1985). 
 66. Id. at 485–86. 
 67. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV:  Affirmation of Affirmative Action 
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 910 (1993).  
 68. Id. 
  
authority.
69
  Ultimately, the argument concludes that the Guidelines are 
binding because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.
70
 accords greater weight to agency statements resulting from 
the rulemaking process.
71
 
Despite the disagreement among commentators and inconclusive 
remarks by the Court, the four-fifths rule remains critical in the 
determination of disparate impact liability.  Therefore, it is necessary that 
this Article considers how the application of the four-fifths rule affects the 
factors used in evaluating the narrowly tailored requirement. 
II. NARROW TAILORING  
When the government implements racially based policies, its policies are 
reviewed under strict scrutiny.
72
  Strict scrutiny requires that racial 
classifications be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental 
purpose.
73
  Strict scrutiny serves the following purposes: 
[It] ―smoke[s] out‖ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
highly suspect tool . . . [and] ensures that the means chosen ―fit‖ this 
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype.
74
  
Narrow tailoring is the component of strict scrutiny that ensures ―the 
means chosen ‗fit‘ [the] compelling goal.‖75  The Court has examined a 
number of factors in determining whether governmental racial 
classifications are narrowly tailored
76
:  the use of quotas,
77
 the flexibility of 
the program,
78
 the duration of the relief,
79
 the scope of the program,
80
 
                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 71. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 910. 
 72. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (―[A]ll racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .‖). 
 73. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that all 
restrictions based on racial classification are suspect unless justified by public necessity).  
 74. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally Ayres & Foster, supra note 23 (discussing the Supreme Court‘s 
approach to narrow tailoring after two recent decisions); Michael K. Fridkin,  
The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justification for Racial Preferences in Public 
Contracting,  
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 519 (2004) (discussing the narrow tailoring issue after Croson).  
 77. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 485, 505 (1989) 
(invalidating a program that set aside thirty percent of contract-award value to Minority 
Business Enterprises); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 320 (1978) 
(invalidating medical school‘s admissions program that set aside sixteen seats for 
underrepresented minorities). 
 78. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).  
  
individualized considerations,
81
 and the necessity of the program compared 
with the efficacy of race neutral alternatives.
82
  Because ―[c]ontext matters 
when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause,‖83 evaluation of the factors for narrow tailoring in some instances 
will depend on the compelling purpose asserted. 
Whether the disparate impact provision must be narrowly tailored 
depends upon whether it is subject to strict scrutiny review.  Consequently, 
because racial classifications may violate the Equal Protection Clause, a 
preliminary determination of whether the disparate impact provision 
implicates racial classifications is necessary.  Relying on Ricci, this Article 
assumes that Title VII‘s disparate impact provision uses racial 
classifications.  In Ricci, the Court characterized the city‘s action as 
―express, race-based decisionmaking‖84 because the city voided the 
examination scores as a result of ―the statistical disparity based on race.‖85  
The Court explained that ―the City rejected the test results because too 
                                                 
 79. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (―Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define 
both the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such 
findings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment 
of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the 
goal of equality itself.‖); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. 
 80. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (―The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond‘s racial 
preference strongly impugns the city‘s claim of remedial motivation.‖). 
 81. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (―As Justice Powell made clear 
in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, 
nonmechanical way.‖); Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (―Based upon proper findings, such 
programs are less problematic from an equal protection standpoint because they treat all 
candidates individually, rather than making the color of an applicant‘s skin the sole relevant 
consideration.‖); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) 
(―The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his 
race is the principal evil of petitioner‘s special admissions program.‖). 
 82. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995) (pointing out 
that the circuit court failed to ―address the question of narrow tailoring in terms of our strict 
scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there was any consideration of the use 
of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in government contracting‖ 
(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507) (internal quotations omitted)); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 
(―In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several 
factors, including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies . . . .‖); 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (―The 
term ‗narrowly tailored,‘ . . . has acquired a secondary meaning.  More specifically, as 
commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether 
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used.  Or, as Professor Ely has 
noted, the classification at issue must ‗fit‘ with greater precision than any alternative 
means.‖ (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 
U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974))). 
Another factor that the Court has considered is whether the use of racial classifications 
―unduly harms members of any racial group.‖  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.  Discussion of this 
factor is beyond the scope of this Article because it is not directly applicable to the disparate 
impact provision. 
 83. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
 84. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009). 
 85. Id. 
  
many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists 
to be certified.‖86  Therefore, this Article proceeds on the premise that the 
disparate impact provision uses racial classifications because it induces 
employers to consider race when making employment decisions, triggering 
strict scrutiny.
87
 
III. QUOTA OR GOAL:  LINE DRAWING, A NUMBERS GAME, OR A MATTER 
OF SEMANTICS? 
The use of quotas is one factor in determining whether the disparate 
impact provision‘s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored.  The 
Court‘s treatment of quotas varies depending on whether there is a remedial 
need for racial classifications.  In cases involving a need to remedy past 
discrimination, the Court has been more accepting of quotas.
88
  On the 
other hand, in the absence of a remedial need, the Court has generally 
rejected quotas but has permitted goals.
89
 
This Part first provides a brief legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and its 1991 amendment codifying the disparate impact provision.  
This Part also explores whether the disparate impact provision can be 
properly characterized as a quota or a permissible goal in order to 
determine if the provision is narrowly tailored.  The analysis proceeds by 
accepting the Court‘s jurisprudence regarding quotas because a normative 
discussion of quotas is beyond the scope of this Article.  
                                                 
 86. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 87. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain way.  
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that 
regulations that authorized, but did not require, employers to administer blood and urine 
tests constituted state action because the government encouraged this practice). 
 88. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (―It is now well established 
that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications 
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to 
discrimination.‖); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
479 (1986) (emphasizing the measure‘s automatic termination once the remedial need ends); 
Richard L. Barnes, Quotas as Satin-lined Traps, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 865, 867 (1995) 
(―Judicially ordered quotas continue to have a place in remedying discrimination . . . .‖);  
Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII:  Disparate Impact 
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle,  
31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 363–64 (1983) (―Indeed, judicially imposed quotas designed to 
remedy unlawful discrimination and affirmative action quotas voluntarily instituted by 
employers to serve as insulation from possible Title VII liability are commonplace and have 
generally fared well under attack in litigation.‖). 
 89. C.f. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (discussing the difficulty in 
classifying measures as remedial or illegitimate); City of Richmond v. Croson,  
488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasizing the impossibility of determining whether the 
measure at issue was remedial); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 
(1978) (explaining that a measure with without a remedial purpose was unjustified because 
it imposed disadvantages on persons who bore no responsibility for the harms suffered by 
the measure‘s beneficiaries).  
  
A. Brief Legislative History Showing Apprehension of Quotas 
Legislative history reveals that, prior to the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, critics were concerned that the Act would require quotas.
90
  
―[M]any opponents of Title VII argued that an employer could be found 
guilty of discrimination under the statute simply because of a racial 
imbalance in his work force, and would be compelled to implement racial 
‗quotas‘ to avoid being charged with liability.‖91  Similar objections to 
quotas resurfaced during the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
92
  
―[C]ounsel to three of the key Senate sponsors‖ revealed that the disparate 
impact provision of the proposed Act triggered the quota objection because 
the provision attempted to codify both liability for unintentional 
discrimination and the business necessity defense.
93
 
Senator Orin Hatch, for example, expressed his concerns:  
[W]hat kind of a society do we really wish to establish? . . . [I]s it a 
society that . . . requires every job in America to match perfectly the 
numerical mix of the surrounding, relevant labor pool; a society where 
every employment policy is governed by numerical quotas?
94
 
Ultimately, the fear of quotas led President George H. W. Bush to veto the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990.
95
  President Bush stated, ―Primarily through 
provisions governing cases in which employment practices are alleged to 
have unintentionally caused the disproportionate exclusion of members of 
                                                 
 90. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 453–65 (describing the congressional debates 
surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and tracing the Act‘s development); Gold, supra 
note 65, at 503–07. 
 91. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 463. 
 92. For discussions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see 
generally Roger Clegg, Introduction:  A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Andrew M. Dansicker, A Sheep in Wolf‘s Clothing:  
Affirmative Action, Disparate Impact, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 1 (1991); Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, ―Quotas‖ and the 
Codification of the Disparate Impact Theory:  What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?,  
55 ALB. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (1991).   
For an insider‘s perspective see C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact:  History and 
Consequences, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (1994); Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act 
of 1991:  Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993).  Peter Leibold, Stephen Sola, and Reginald Jones ―were 
intimately involved in the negotiations surrounding the 1991 bill‖ as counsel to senators.  Id. 
at 1043.  C. Boyden Gray played a key role during the negotiations of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 by serving as Counsel to the President of the United States. Gray, supra, at 1487.  
 93. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043–44. 
 94. Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:  A ―Quota Bill,‖ a Codification 
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
287, 288 n.5 (1993) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 29,527 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch)). 
 95. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act:  A Constitutional, Statutory, and 
Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913–14 (1993) (discussing the failure 
of the 1990 Act). 
  
certain groups, the [1990 Act] creates powerful incentives for employers to 
adopt hiring and promotion quotas.‖96 
Interestingly, the Democrats in both the House of Representatives and 
Senate had adopted anti-quota language in the 1990 bill.
97
  Later, as a result 
of compromise, the anti-quota language was deleted.
98
  Senator Dole and 
the President explained that the anti-quota language was omitted because it 
was unnecessary, as ―the bill was not a quota bill at all.‖99  In November 
1991, after a tumultuous two-year battle, the President signed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.
100
 
B. The Court‘s Treatment of Quotas for Non-Remedial Need 
Except for Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court has invalidated most cases 
involving governmental racial classifications for nonremedial need, 
purposes other than remedying past discrimination, under strict scrutiny‘s 
narrowly tailored prong.  In Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke
101
 the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school‘s admissions 
program, which set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats in its entering 
class for minorities.
102
  Although the Court recognized that the medical 
school‘s goal of advancing diversity was a compelling interest,103 the Court 
held that the program was not narrowly tailored.
104
 
In its defense, the medical school attempted to distinguish its program 
from a quota.  A quota, according to the medical school, is ―a requirement 
which must be met but can never be exceeded, regardless of the quality of 
the minority applicants.‖105  The medical school argued that its admissions 
process was not a quota because there was ―no ‗floor‘ under the total 
number of minority students admitted; completely unqualified students 
[would] not be admitted simply to meet a ‗quota.‘  Neither [was] there a 
‗ceiling,‘ since an unlimited number could be admitted through the general 
admissions process.‖106 
The Court rejected this ―semantic distinction‖ because sixteen seats were 
reserved for minority applicants without competition from white 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 913–14 (quoting Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990)).  
 97. See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914 (discussing the disappearance of the anti-
quota language adopted by both houses of Congress). 
 98. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914. 
 99. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043. 
 101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 102. Id. at 289. 
 103. Id. at 314. 
 104. Id. at 320. 
 105. Id. at 288 n.26. 
 106. Id. 
  
applicants.
107
  White applicants could vie only for eighty-four seats while 
minorities were able to compete for all one hundred seats.
108
  The Court 
concluded, ―[w]hether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is 
a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.‖109 
The Court, however, later found the distinction between a quota and a 
goal significant.
110
  In Grutter, the Court upheld a law school‘s admissions 
program that considered race as one factor to advance the school‘s 
objective of attaining a ―critical mass‖ of diverse students in its entering 
class.
111
  The Court declared that ―[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race-
conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system‖ and validated 
the law school‘s program because it did not rely on a rigid quota.112  As the 
Court defined:  
[A] quota is a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of 
opportunities are reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.  
Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or 
which cannot be exceeded, and insulate the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates for the available seats.
113
 
In contrast, ―a permissible goal requires only a good-faith effort to come 
within a range demarcated by the goal itself, and permits consideration of 
race as a plus factor in any given case while still ensuring that each 
candidate competes with all other qualified applicants.‖114  Ultimately, the 
Court decided that the admissions program fell within a permissible goal.
115
  
Additionally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
116
 the Court 
invalidated a program that required contractors who were awarded city 
contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the award to Minority 
Business Enterprises.
117
  The city could not show a remedial need for the 
program because there was no evidence of past discrimination by the 
                                                 
 107. Id. at 289. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  The Court compared the medical school‘s program to Harvard‘s, pointing out 
that ―[i]n Harvard College admissions the Committee did not set target-quotas for the 
number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted 
in a given year.‖  Id. at 316 (citation omitted).  
By implication, the Court seemed to view the program in Bakke as a quota. 
 110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003). 
 111. See id. at 318 (defining critical mass as ―‗meaningful numbers‘ or  ‗meaningful 
representation,‘ which [the school] understood to mean a number that encourages 
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated‖). 
 112. Id. at 334.  
 113. Id. at 335 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  
 115. See id. at 335–36 (―The Law School‘s goal of attaining a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.‖). 
 116. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 117. Id. at 477, 485–86.   
  
city.
118
  The Court concluded that the thirty percent figure was a ―rigid 
racial quota‖119 that was not narrowly tailored because race neutral 
alternatives were available and it unrealistically assumed that minorities 
will select a particular job in proportion to their representation in the local 
population.
120
  
C. The Court‘s Treatment of Quotas for Remedial Need 
Quotas designed to remedy past discrimination have had greater success 
in meeting the narrow tailoring requirement.  For example, in Local 28 of 
the Sheet Metal Workers‘ International Ass‘n v. EEOC,121 (―Sheet Metal 
Workers‖) the Court upheld a ―membership goal‖ imposed as remedial 
relief for prior union discrimination against African Americans as being 
narrowly tailored.
122
  Due to the union‘s ―long and persistent pattern of 
discrimination‖ that had ―consistently and egregiously violated Title 
VII,‖123 the district court established a twenty-nine percent non-white 
membership goal.
124
  The Court concluded that the goal was necessary to 
redress the ―lingering effects of past discrimination.‖125   
The flexibility of the goal, evidenced by the district court‘s adjustments 
in response to changes in the union, was another persuasive factor in Sheet 
Metal Workers.
126
  The Court highlighted that the district court‘s flexibility 
in adjusting the deadline for achieving the membership goal was evidence 
that the goal was not a device for attaining and maintaining racial balance, 
but ―rather [w]as a bench mark against which the court could gauge [the 
union‘s] efforts to remedy past discrimination.‖127  Additionally, the 
temporary nature of the goal—that the program would end as soon as the 
union achieved the sought after membership—was significant in the 
Court‘s analysis of whether the goal was narrowly tailored.128  
                                                 
 118. Id. at 480.  
 119. Id. at 499. 
 120. Id. at 507. 
 121. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
 122. Id. at 476–77.  The court ordered goal in Sheet Metal Workers survived challenges 
under equal protection and Title VII.  See id. at 479–80 (stating that petitioners raised a 
claim under the ―equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment‖). 
 123. Id. at 433. 
 124. Id. at 432.  
 125. Id. at 477.  The Court did not review the appropriateness of the twenty-nine percent 
figure because that figure had been set for at least ten years, the court of appeals had 
affirmed that figure twice before, and the parties did not raise this particular issue for the 
Court‘s review.  Id. at 441.  
 126. Id. at 477–78. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 479. 
  
In United States v. Paradise,
129
 the Court upheld another ―goal‖ intended 
to redress past discrimination against African Americans by the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety.
130
  The district court ordered the hiring of one 
African American trooper for each Caucasian trooper until the state-wide 
percentage of African American troopers reached twenty-five percent.
131
  
Concluding that the one-for-one requirement was ―flexible, waivable, and 
temporary,‖132 the Court explained that it was not a goal, but rather the pace 
at which the twenty-five percent goal would be met,
133
 similar to the 
objective in Sheet Metal Workers.
134
 
D. Does the Disparate Impact Provision Impose or Operate as a Quota? 
The disparate impact provision does not explicitly require quotas,
135
 and 
in fact, § 703(j) of Title VII disavows any requirement for preferences on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.
136
  But this 
disavowal is not sufficient to dispel the suggestion that the provision 
operates as a quota.   
An argument can be made that when the disparate impact provision is 
applied, it falls within the definition of ―quota‖137 provided in Bakke and 
Grutter.
138
  Similar to the quota in Bakke,
139
 the disparate impact provision 
reserves a percentage exclusively for other racial groups without 
competition.  Under the four-fifths rule, if there is at least twenty percent 
separation between the selection rate of the highest performing racial group 
and other groups, then a plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.
140
  In this way, the disparate impact provision essentially reserves a 
                                                 
 129. 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1986). 
 130. Id. at 185–86.  The Court also upheld quotas in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979), but this Article does not rely on Weber because it involved a voluntary 
quota agreement entered into by private parties lacking state action and the parties raised 
only a Title VII claim, not an Equal Protection challenge.  See id. at 197 (describing a 
collective bargaining agreement between employer and union).  
 131. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154–55. 
 132. Id. at 178. 
 133. Id. at 179.  
 134. Id. at 180 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487–88 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 135. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―To be 
sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas . . . .‖).  
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006). 
 137. I do not use ―quota‖ as a pejorative but rather as a label for programs that are not 
permissible goals.  
 138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (identifying race as a factor in 
determining admission to a law school); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 269–70 (1978) (noting the set-aside program was implemented to ensure a specified 
number of minority students were admitted to the medical school program). 
 139. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (describing the medical school‘s policy of admitting a 
prescribed number of minority students). 
 140. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010) (holding that a claim is 
established by showing that an employer ―uses a particular employment practice that causes 
  
representation rate that is eighty percent of the most successful group‘s 
selection rate.  Additionally, the Grutter Court permitted universities to 
―consider race or ethnicity only as a ‗plus‘ in a particular applicant‘s file, 
without insulating the individual from comparison with all other candidates 
for the available seats.‖141  The disparate impact provision‘s twenty percent 
reservation insulates groups from comparison, contrary to the program 
approved in Grutter.
142
   
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the disparate impact 
provision as a permissible goal like Grutter‘s critical mass.143  One can 
argue that the disparate impact provision functions like a goal because like 
critical mass, the disparate impact provision does not establish a set number 
needed to meet the goal.
144
  Even though the four-fifths rule equates to 
eighty percent, it is set in relation to the group with the highest pass rate.
145
  
Consider two examples.  First, if Caucasians had the highest pass rate in 
Ricci with one hundred percent passing the test, then there would be a 
prima facie case of disparate impact if less than eighty percent of African 
American firefighters passed.  Second, assume again that Caucasians had 
the highest pass rate, but with only fifty percent passing the test.  In this 
case, there would be a disparate impact if less than forty percent of African 
American firefighters passed.  Thus, there is no ―quota‖ because the 
number of people required to pass in order to avoid prima facie liability 
would depend on the group with the highest pass rate.   
Also, the disparate impact provision can be characterized as a 
permissible goal because it allows consideration of race plus other factors, 
similar to critical mass.  The provision does not rest solely on race but takes 
into consideration other factors, such as whether the employment practice 
is justified by business necessity and is job related and whether other 
equally effective alternatives with fewer adverse effects exist.
146
  
There are, however, several problems with equating the disparate impact 
provision to critical mass.  First, although there is no predetermined 
number set by the disparate impact provision, there is a predetermined 
                                                 
a disparate impact‖ on one of the prohibited bases); EEOC Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). 
 141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations 
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 142. See id. (explaining that the policy allowed race to be considered in ―a flexible, 
nonmechanical way‖). 
 143. See id. at 315–16 (describing the law school‘s goal of achieving a critical mass of 
diverse students to enrich education).  
 144. See id. at 335 (emphasizing that the law school did not maintain specified numbers 
for minority enrollment).  
 145. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(2010). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
  
percentage or proportion established by the four-fifths rule that must be met 
to avoid a prima facie case of disparate impact.
147
  In contrast, the critical 
mass concept approved by the Grutter Court was not quantified by 
numbers or percentages.
148
   
Second, the disparate impact provision does not allow for ―a range 
demarcated by the goal itself‖ like with critical mass.149  In an admissions 
program, the number of students that are needed for a critical mass of 
diverse students in the entering class can change from year to year.
150
  But 
the proportion or percentage set by the four-fifths rule needed to satisfy the 
disparate impact provision is fixed not only from year to year (unless the 
EEOC passes new Guidelines), but also fixed for all employers. 
Third, the disparate impact provision differs from critical mass because 
critical mass affords consideration of race plus other factors.  Although the 
disparate impact provision considers other factors for ultimately 
determining liability, race is the only consideration at the initial stage.  A 
plaintiff can show a prima facie case of disparate impact merely on race 
alone.  ―Unless and until the defendant [employer] pleads and proves a 
business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated 
elements‖ of disparate impact.151  If an employment practice fails the four-
fifths rule, an employer must defend against a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.
152
  Although the disparate impact provision affords employers the 
defense of business necessity and job relatedness, it may be of limited 
consolation because the costs associated with mounting the defense can be 
prohibitive.
153
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 149. Id. at 335 (quoting Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 
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Fourth, the disparate impact provision is distinguishable from critical 
mass because it lacks a demonstrated need for the quota set by the 
provision.  In Grutter, the Court approved critical mass because the school 
justified that a critical mass of diverse students was integral to the school‘s 
educational mission.
154
  In contrast, in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
155
 (―Parents Involved‖) the school 
board‘s failure to show a need for the sought-after level of diversity led to 
the Court‘s conclusion that the board‘s student assignment was not 
narrowly tailored.
156
  In that case, the school board used each school‘s 
racial balance as one factor in placing students.
157
  If the school‘s racial 
distribution was not within ten percentage points of the district‘s white to 
non-white racial composition, then a student who would contribute to the 
school‘s racial balance would be assigned to the school.158  The Court 
explained, ―[t]he plans are tied to each district‘s specific racial 
demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of 
diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.‖159   
Similarly, the disparate impact provision fails to demonstrate a need for 
the level specified by the four-fifths rule.  Researchers have criticized the 
four-fifths rule as arbitrary.
160
  This ―arbitrariness‖ could be due to the fact 
that the four-fifths or eighty percent rule resulted from two compromises:  
(1) a desire expressed by those writing and having input into the 
Guidelines to include a statistical test as the primary step but knowing 
from an administrative point of view a statistical test was not possible for 
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the FEPC consultants who had to work the enforcement of the 
Guidelines, and (2) a way to split the middle between two camps, the 
70% camp and the 90% camp.
161
 
Consistent with Parents Involved, the EEOC would need to provide data 
to support the chosen eighty percent over seventy percent, ninety percent, 
or any other percentage and that the four-fifths rule is necessary to achieve 
the goal envisioned by the disparate impact provision.
162
  Absent 
supporting evidence for the four-fifths rule, it is, as the Court pointed out in 
Sheet Metal Workers, ―completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of 
each race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer . . . 
absent unlawful discrimination.‖163 
Additionally, even if the EEOC were to jettison the four-fifths rule or 
another variation of the rule, the disparate impact could not operate 
practically as a ―goal‖ like critical mass.  The unique concerns of 
uniformity of enforcement as well as giving notice to prospective plaintiffs 
and defendants as to when liability may result for disparate impact make 
the critical mass approach inapplicable to disparate impact.  Critical mass is 
an approach to using racial classifications that is unique to the educational 
context.
164
   
Critical mass has been used to describe three conditions:  
[T]he existence of a precise minimum level of the required material for a 
change to take place; a change that is sudden and transformative; and 
that the change is not simply a function of a minimum level of the 
resource but also a function of how elements of that resource interact 
with one another.
165
 
In the educational context, the law school in Grutter used critical mass to 
refer to ―meaningful numbers‖ or ―meaningful representation‖ needed to 
encourage minority participation in the classroom without the sense of 
isolation.
166
  In this regard, a university can practically operate an 
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admissions program without a defined number as to when critical mass is 
achieved.  It would be hard to imagine, however, how the EEOC could 
enforce the disparate impact provision without a defined number or 
percentage to serve as a point of reference in assessing when a 
disproportionate adverse effect rises to the level of disparate impact.  First, 
the EEOC would need to establish a threshold to ensure that it uniformly 
enforces the disparate impact provision and does not violate employers‘ 
equal protection rights by varying its application.
167
   
Second, the EEOC would also need to be wary of due process claims for 
assessing liability upon employers without giving them notice as to what 
constitutes disparate impact.  The Due Process Clause has been interpreted 
to encompass procedural and substantive due process.
168
  Procedural due 
process requires providing notice before a person‘s life, liberty, or property 
can be taken away.
169
  An employer would not have adequate notice if it 
did not have sufficient information to conform its behavior to the law.  
Here, if the disparate impact provision operates without a defined 
threshold, like critical mass, employers will not know what level of 
disparity is actionable against them.  Concomitantly, without a defined 
threshold that would trigger disparate impact, prospective plaintiffs would 
not know the appropriate circumstances under which to file a disparate 
impact claim.  Thus, even if the EEOC were to proceed without the four-
fifths rule, it would be difficult for the disparate impact provision to be 
enforced without some numerical or percentage threshold.  Whatever the 
form, any threshold is likely to operate as a quota because it draws a line on 
the basis of race.
170
  
IV. FLEXIBILITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED DECISION MAKING  
A second factor in considering whether a program is narrowly tailored 
includes the program‘s flexibility and individualized decision making.  A 
program‘s flexibility and individualized decision making are interrelated 
with each other and the quota factor in that the characteristics relevant to 
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the quota factor may also be relevant to the flexibility and individualized 
decision making of the program. 
A. Flexibility 
In evaluating whether remedial race-conscious measures are narrowly 
tailored, the Court has been concerned with the flexibility of the remedy.  
In Paradise, the Court concluded that the one-for-one promotion quota was 
flexible because the plan allowed for waiver in the absence of qualified 
African American candidates.
171
  In Sheet Metal Workers, the membership 
goal was narrowly tailored because the goal was flexible—the district court 
twice extended the deadline and accommodated the union‘s economic 
changes by adjusting the apprenticeship class size.
172
  The flexibility of the 
Harvard admissions program countenanced by Bakke allowed for variation 
in the weight accorded to a particular factor each year, as the mix of the 
student body changed.
173
  Similarly, the flexibility of the program in 
Grutter allowed for yearly fluctuation in the number of underrepresented 
minority student enrollment.
174
  
In contrast, the disparate impact provision does not appear to be flexible 
like the goals in Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, Bakke, or Grutter.  There 
are no waivers or exceptions to the enforcement of the disparate impact 
provision.  Additionally, the disparate impact provision does not allow for 
yearly variation based on an employer‘s need like the Harvard plan in 
Bakke or the plan in Grutter.
175
  The ratio established by the four-fifths rule 
remains constant in each case, regardless of whether an employer‘s needs 
necessitate variation.   
The constancy of the four-fifths rule is problematic for another reason.  
The Court requires that for a race-conscious program to satisfy the narrow 
tailoring requirement, the weight placed on race should be no more than is 
necessary to achieve the compelling government interest.
176
  The four-fifths 
rule places the same amount of weight on race regardless of the compelling 
interest being asserted to justify the disparate impact provision‘s racial 
classification.  Whether the provision might be justified because it seeks to 
obtain the benefits of diversity, provide role models, meet operational 
needs, smoke out discrimination, or provide equal employment 
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opportunities, the four-fifths rule is the only method allowed for achieving 
the desired objective.   
In Bakke
177
 and Grutter,
178
 the Court recognized the need for the 
program to vary the weight placed on racial factors.  Allowing for variation 
ensures that the weight placed on race will be no more than necessary.  The 
four-fifths rule does not afford variation depending upon the asserted goal 
or the employer‘s needs. 
B. Individualized Decision Making 
Individualized decision making is another factor relevant to determining 
whether disparate impact meets the requirement of narrow tailoring.  
Individualized decision making includes requiring preferences that are not 
quantified,
179
 are differentiated,
180
 and are not excessive.
181
  In Bakke, the 
Court was concerned by the medical school admissions program‘s sole 
focus on ethnic diversity.
182
  The Court concluded that assigning a fixed 
number of seats to minorities was not necessary
183
 because it was not the 
only means to achieve diversity.
184
  In juxtaposition, the Bakke Court 
discussed with approval the admissions program administered at Harvard 
College.
185
   
Although race or ethnicity may have operated as a ―plus‖ for an 
applicant, race was not a decisive factor in Harvard‘s admissions 
program.
186
  Instead, the Harvard policy included other qualities in 
consideration of diversity and allowed the weight accorded to each factor to 
vary each year, depending upon the attributes of the current student body 
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and candidates for the incoming class.
187
  Thus, the Harvard program 
employed race ―in a flexible, nonmechanical way‖ that permitted 
individualized consideration of each applicant.
188
  The Bakke plurality 
―developed the individualized consideration requirement in order to police 
the distinction between an affirmative action program in which race was a 
legitimate (but not predominant) element of difference, and an affirmative 
action program that was sliding toward ‗the functional equivalent of a 
quota system.‘‖189 
In Grutter, the Court concluded that the law school‘s program was 
narrowly tailored like the Harvard program because of its flexibility.
190
  
The law school‘s program provided a ―highly individualized, holistic 
review [for] each applicant‘s file,‖ regardless of race.191  
In contrast to the Harvard program discussed in Bakke and the Grutter 
program, the lack of individualized decision making was one factor that led 
to the invalidation of the admissions program in the companion case Gratz 
v. Bollinger.
192
  In Gratz, an undergraduate university employed a multi-
factored admissions system that included the following:  ―the quality of an 
applicant‘s high school (S), the strength of an applicant‘s high school 
curriculum (C), an applicant‘s unusual circumstances (U), an applicant‘s 
geographical residence (G), and an applicant‘s alumni relationship (A).‖193  
In addition  
to these factors, the university considered an applicant‘s ―underrepresented 
minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at a high school 
with a predominantly underrepresented minority population, or 
underrepresentation in the unit to which the student was applying.‖194  The 
Court held that the University‘s program was not narrowly tailored because 
the school automatically awarded twenty points to every underrepresented 
minority, which amounted to one-fifth of the necessary points for 
admission.
195
  Although the admissions program in Gratz used race as a 
―plus‖ factor like the Harvard program and Grutter program, the automatic 
distribution of twenty points did not allow for individualized decision 
making.
196
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Similarly, in Parents Involved, although the school district employed a 
multi-tiered system of tiebreakers, the Court nonetheless concluded that 
―under each plan when race comes into play, it [was] decisive by itself.‖197  
Consequently, the school assignment policy was not narrowly tailored 
because it employed racial factors in a mechanical, rather than 
individualized manner.
198
  
As seen in the above cases, in order for the disparate impact provision to 
satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, it must provide individualized 
consideration through case-by-case evaluation.  Determining whether the 
provision meets this requirement can be evaluated by framing the issue in 
two ways.  First, does the disparate impact provision force employers to 
use racial classification in making employment decisions in a non-
individualized fashion?  When framed this way, it appears that the 
provision removes individualized decision making from employers because 
of the four-fifths rule.  Even if an employer were to evaluate each 
candidate‘s application individually, an employer would create a prima 
facie violation of the provision if a disparity of more than twenty percent 
occurs between the selection rate of the most successful group and other 
racial groups.  Even though other factors are later considered in assessing 
liability, race is the only factor in determining if there is a prima facie 
violation.  Like the impact of the automatic twenty point distribution in 
Gratz and the multi-tiered tiebreaker system in Parents Involved, the four-
fifths rule makes race a decisive factor for identifying prima facie 
violations.  Thus, the decisive role that race plays in implicating a prima 
facie case of disparate impact supports Justice Scalia‘s criticism that ―the 
disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly . . . since they fail to provide 
an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, 
or perhaps even for good-faith plus hiring standards that are entirely 
reasonable.‖199   
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Another way to frame the issue is whether the provision allows for 
individualized consideration by the courts in assessing disparate impact 
liability.  It is possible that the disparate impact provision satisfies the 
requirement for individualized decision making because the provision 
affords consideration of multiple factors in ultimately determining liability.  
Before liability is finally assessed under the provision, a court reviews 
whether an employer‘s business practice is a business necessity and job 
related.
200
  Additionally, a court considers whether an employer refused to 
use an equally effective alternative with less adverse effect.
201
   
When framed in this way, the disparate impact provision avoids the 
deficiency of Gratz.  In Gratz, individualized decision making could take 
place once a file was flagged, but the Court was unpersuaded by this 
possibility because individual review occurred in exceptional cases, not as 
a general rule.
202
  The disparate impact provision, however, provides 
individual consideration of other factors in every case of prima facie 
disparate impact to ultimately determine liability.
203
  In this regard, the 
provision comports with Grutter and Bakke‘s conceptions of holistic, 
individual review because race is not the decisive factor in the final 
assessment of disparate impact liability.
204
  Thus, whether the disparate 
impact provision affords individualized consideration to meet strict 
scrutiny‘s narrowly tailored requirement depends upon whether the 
provision is evaluated at the initial stage when a prima facie case of 
disparate impact arises or at the final stage of determining liability when 
defenses are considered.  
V. SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM:  OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE 
A. The Court‘s Treatment of Underinclusive and Overinclusive Acts 
For the disparate impact provision‘s use of racial classification to be 
narrowly tailored, such classifications must not be underinclusive or 
overinclusive.  An underinclusive classification results when legislation 
fails to encompass all similarly situated people in terms of the legislation‘s 
objective; some people are included while others who are similarly situated 
for purposes of the law are excluded.
205
  Overinclusiveness occurs when the 
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legislation overreaches in its inclusion of all persons similarly situated for 
the purpose of the law and of persons whose inclusion is not relevant to the 
law‘s objective.206 
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term ―underinclusive‖ in its 
analysis in Parents Involved, two concepts of underinclusiveness can be 
construed from that case. First, underinclusive can mean failure to include 
the persons who should be included for the purpose of the law.
207
  The 
plurality in Parents Involved questioned the school districts‘ purported 
interest in achieving diversity when the districts focused solely on ethnic 
diversity, without considering the ―far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.‖208  In this regard, the focus on racial or ethnic origin 
was underinclusive for the goal of achieving diversity.
209
  Moreover, with 
respect to the consideration of racial diversity, the districts were 
underinclusive by considering race exclusively in terms of white and non-
white or black and ―other.‖210   
A second concept of underinclusiveness entails the minimal impact or 
effectiveness of the legislation at achieving its goal.  In Parents Involved, 
the Court pointed out that the racial tiebreaker ultimately shifted a small 
number of students.
211
  The limited impact undermined the necessity of 
using racial classification to achieve the asserted goal of racial integration 
for socialization and education.
212
   
Overinclusiveness is another factor that is detrimental to a race-
conscious program.  In Croson, the ―gross overinclusiveness‖ of the plan 
undermined the argument that the plan was narrowly tailored.
213
  The Court 
criticized the plan for its ―random inclusion‖ of racial groups that were not 
victims of discrimination
214
 by allowing any qualified Minority Business 
Enterprise to take advantage of the thirty percent set aside.
215
 
                                                 
 206. Id.  
 207. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 
(2007) (plurality opinion). 
 208. Id. at 722 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 209. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (―To the extent the objective is sufficient 
diversity[,] . . . using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is 
fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.‖). 
 210. Id. at 703. 
 211. Id. at 733.  
 212. Id. at 734; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-
Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and 
Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 285 (2009) (suggesting that limited impact 
indicates existence of alternatives). 
 213. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989).  
 214. Id. at 506. 
 215. Id. at 478. 
  
Similarly, in Bakke, the Court questioned the medical school‘s inclusion 
of African Americans, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Asians 
among the preferred groups for the sixteen seats set aside, noting that 
Asians were already admitted in great numbers.
216
  This remark implied 
that Asians did not need preferential treatment through the quota and that 
the Court deemed admissions policy to be overinclusive because of their 
inclusion.
217
 
The impact of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness on satisfying 
the narrowly tailored requirement is even more pronounced beyond the 
context of racial classifications.  In Citizens United v. FEC,
218
 the Court 
invalidated a statute as violative of the First Amendment because the 
statute prohibited independent corporate expenditures advocating a 
candidate‘s election or defeat.219  The purpose of the statute was to protect 
shareholders from being compelled to finance corporate political speech, 
but the statute was considered both underinclusive and overinclusive.
220
 As 
to underinclusiveness, the statute only prohibited speech in certain media 
and within a certain time frame, even though a shareholder‘s interest would 
be affected regardless of the type of media or time.
221
  Overinclusiveness 
resulted from the statute‘s inclusion of all corporations, including nonprofit 
and single-shareholder for-profit corporations.
222
   
In Carey v. Brown,
223
 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited 
picketing of residences or dwellings but allowed peaceful labor 
picketing.
224
  The state enacted the statute for the purposes of protecting the 
peace and privacy of residents from nonlabor picketing,
225
 but the Court 
concluded that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
226
  The 
statute was both overinclusive and underinclusive because it permitted 
peaceful labor picketing without regard to the disturbances that would 
result while it broadly banned nonlabor picketing without distinguishing 
among the harms  
to residential privacy.
227
  Therefore, the cases demonstrate  
that overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness undermines the 
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reasonableness of a program‘s scope and its satisfaction of the narrowly 
tailored requirement.  
B. Overinclusive and Underinclusive Due to Probability for Error 
When the disparate impact provision is evaluated for overinclusiveness 
and underinclusiveness to determine narrow tailoring, one may find the 
provision‘s scope to be problematic. The disparate impact provision is not 
narrowly tailored because it may be overinclusive or underinclusive as a 
result of its probability for error.  If the provision is overinclusive or 
underinclusive, its racial classifications are unnecessary and alternatives are 
likely available.   
A program may be overinclusive and/or underinclusive if it is not 
accurate.  Studies show that the probability of error with applying the four-
fifths rule is high.
228
  Researchers have identified three problems arising 
from the four-fifths rule:  
(1) there is a high probability that an employer will be found to be 
discriminating under the four-fifths rule, when in fact, he is not 
discriminating; (2) there is a high probability that an employer will be 
held harmless due to compliance with the four-fifths rule when, in fact, 
he is discriminating against a group of employees; and (3) the four-fifths 
rule and statistical significance criterion indicate discrimination in quite 
different situations.
229
 
In one study, Professor Anthony Boardman determined the probability of 
making Type I errors (false positives) and Type II errors (false 
negatives).
230
  Professor Boardman calculated the outcomes in situations 
involving two groups and in situations with more than two groups.
231
  He 
found that the probability for error in claiming an adverse impact when 
none existed (Type I error) was greater than fifty percent when there were 
two groups with fewer than twenty-five people.
232
  For situations involving 
                                                 
 228. Anthony E. Boardman, Another Analysis of the EEOC ―Four-Fifths‖ Rule, 25 
MGMT. SCI. 770, 776 (1979).  
 229. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983).  But see 
Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169 (―The 80% rule appears to be a reasonable articulation of 
a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant differences are substantial 
enough to warrant legal liability.‖). 
 230. Boardman, supra note 228, at 770 (using a model that assumed that the number of 
people promoted is predetermined). 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 776.  Professor Boardman provides detailed explanation of his model and 
formulas, but there is no explanation for what may account for Type I and Type II errors, or 
why the percentages for these errors are so high.  
  
more than two groups, the probabilities for Type I errors were higher.
233
  
The chances that people who were adversely impacted but failed to claim 
adverse impact (Type II errors) were higher than forty percent, regardless 
of whether there were two or three groups.
234
   
As Professor Boardman concluded, ―the EEOC‘s rule appears to invite 
considerable inappropriate litigation‖ while ―fail[ing] to clearly indicate 
discrimination when discrimination exists.‖235  Although it is not clear 
whether a fifty percent likelihood of a Type I error by a prospective 
claimant will necessarily equate to a fifty percent likelihood of enforcement 
by the EEOC and private parties,
236
 an over-filing of adverse impact claims 
increases the chances that these mistaken claims will lead to erroneous 
over-enforcement of the disparate impact provision and erroneous 
assessment of liability.   
The implication of Type II errors is clearer.  Assuming that the bulk of 
disparate impact litigation result from claimants filing charges with the 
EEOC (as opposed to the EEOC initiating charges),
237
 if there is a forty 
percent likelihood that potential claimants are failing to file adverse impact 
                                                 
 233. Id.; see also Irwin Greenberg, An Analysis of the EEOC ―Four-Fifths‖ Rule,  
25 MGMT. SCI. 762, 765 (1979) (―As the number of groups increases, the chance of making 
a type I error increases.‖). 
 234. Boardman, supra note 228, at 776. 
 235. Id.; see also Richard M. Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 55 INDUS. REL. L. J. 493, 493 n.3 (1979) (concluding that the four-
fifths rule ―can lead either to the false charge of adverse impact or to the conclusion that no 
adverse impact exists when, in fact, the employer‘s selection procedure is discriminatory‖); 
Greenberg, supra note 233, at 766 (―[I]t is clear that the four-fifths rule is not well-suited to 
achieve equal employment opportunities.‖). 
 236. An unlawful employment complaint begins with a written charged filed by a 
complainant under oath.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).  The Commission determines, after 
an investigation, whether it has a reasonable cause to believe the charges are true.  After 
such a determination, the Commission may pursue the charges by ―informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.‖  Id.   
If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance within a set time, the 
complainant or, under certain circumstances, another alleged to be aggrieved, or the EEOC 
may file a civil action.  Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  Thus, although the Commission is responsible 
for reviewing every charge, the Commission may not pursue every charge beyond the 
investigation phase.  The right-to-sue letter imposes a condition precedent for private parties 
filing a Title VII claim in federal court.  Roy L. Brooks, Beyond Civil Rights Restoration 
Legislation:  Restructuring Title VII, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 551, 557 (1989).   
For example, in 2010, the Commission received 35,890 charges alleging race-based 
discrimination.  Of those charges filed, the Commission determined ―no reasonable cause‖ 
existed for 26,319 charges (70.1%) and ―reasonable cause‖ existed for 1,330 charges 
(3.5%).  The statistics provided by the EEOC do not distinguish between disparate treatment 
charges and disparate impact charges.  See Race-Based Charges:   
FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm, (last visited February 14, 2011) 
(compiling data on race-based discrimination).  
 237. A member of the EEOC may file a charge when the member believes an unlawful 
employment practice exists.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)(2006); see also BARBARA T. 
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1626, 1659–62 (C. 
Geoffrey Weirich et al., eds, 4th ed. 2007)(discussing a commissioner‘s charge). 
  
charges, it is reasonable to conclude that this percentage strongly correlates 
to the percentage of under-enforcement by the EEOC and private parties.  
Thus, Professor Boardman‘s study reveals the immense likelihood that the 
four-fifths rule will be overinclusive, casting its enforcement net so widely 
that it captures employers who are not in fact causing an adverse impact.
238
  
His study also supports an inference that the four-fifths rule is 
underinclusive, failing to capture the employers who are in fact causing an 
adverse impact.
239
   
Numerous studies have yielded similar results.
240
  For example, 
Professors Marion Gross Sobol and Charles Ellard concluded that in some 
circumstances ―the four-fifths rule signals discrimination when in fact there 
is none; the four-fifths rule seems to exaggerate true adverse impact.‖241  
They also found that in other situations, however, ―[t]he four-fifths rule, 
instead of exaggerating discrimination with large . . . numbers, is not 
sensitive enough to the discriminatory situation.  Thus, under the four-fifths 
rule, Type II error is committed.‖242 
Although a majority of the studies on the four-fifths rule were conducted 
on the heels of the EEOC‘s promulgation of the rule in 1978, recent studies 
also confirm the fallibility of the rule.  In one study, researchers conducted 
a statistical survey of the data in Ricci and concluded that a fair, non-
discriminatory test for either the lieutenant or captain position would fail 
the four-fifths rule nearly seventy percent of the time.
243
  Additionally, fair 
tests for both positions would fail the four-fifths rule at least sixty percent 
of the time.
244
  Researchers using the 0.05 significance level
245
 found that 
                                                 
 238. See Boardman, supra note 228, at 776 (concluding that this fraction system presents 
a double bind:  any change to avoid finding discrimination in innocent employers risks 
failing to uncover real discrimination). 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35. 
 240. See generally Louis J. Braun, Statistics and the Law:  Hypothesis Testing and Its 
Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 80–81 (1980) (―This rule can easily 
lead to inaccurate results.‖); Cohn, supra note 235 (arguing that reliance on quantitative data 
can mislead employment discrimination litigants); Greenberg, supra note 233 (showing that 
the four-fifths rule fails due to both types of errors); Meier et al., supra note 63 (comparing 
two statistical tests and finding the four-fifths rule more helpful for determining substantial 
discrimination); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48 (finding that, depending on the particular 
values used, the four-fifths rule can lead to both types of errors); Van Bowen & Riggins, 
supra note 45 (testing the four-fifths methodology for uniformity across employers and 
finding it lacking). 
 241. Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 395. 
 242. Id. at 396.  
 243. Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in 
Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences Than the U.S. Government‘s ‗Four-
Fifths‘ Rule:  An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L., 
PROBABILITY & RISK 171, 171 (2009).  
 244. Id. 
 245. Levels of significance are evidentiary mechanisms of disproving a hypothesis.  R.A. 
Fisher, responsible for developing the concept of ―level of significance,‖ regarded  
  
despite the lower courts‘ conclusions that both the lieutenant and captain 
examinations in Ricci had a disparate impact, only one of the tests had 
differences in pass rates that were statistically significant.
246
  The research 
concluded that differences in pass rates on the lieutenant examination were 
statistically significant, whereas the pass rate differences on the captain 
examination ―were not close to statistical significance.‖247 
What accounts for the high probability of Type I and II errors in these 
studies has not been explained, but perhaps the probability of errors is 
related to the four-fifths rule as a threshold for proving disparate impact.  
The four-fifths rule may be overinclusive and underinclusive depending on 
the size of the employer.
248
  For example, ―a small employer with a small 
absolute disparity between male and female applicants might face liability 
under the rule, while a large employer can have a much greater disparity 
and still comply with the four-fifths rule.‖249  
Sample size (the size of the employer, i.e., the number of employees in a 
business) also affects statistical significance tests.
250
  ―[T]he smaller the 
sample size, the larger the disparity in rates can be without reaching 
                                                 
any test of significance that results in a larger than 5% significance level (i.e., less 
than 1.96 standard errors) as unpersuasive, a difference with significance level 
between 5% and 2% (i.e., between 1.96 and 2.33 standard errors) as credible, and a 
difference with significance level more extreme than 2% (i.e., greater than 2.33 
standard errors) as clearly indicative of a real, underlying difference. 
Meier et al., supra note 63 63, at 151.  An event found to be significant at the 2% level 
means a smaller probability that the event resulted from randomness as compared with a 5% 
level of significance.  Id.   
Researchers generally use a five percent (0.05) level of significance, which is also known 
as the ninety-five percent confidence level.  See Peresie, supra note 161, at 785; Elaine W. 
Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing:  Statistical Proof 
under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 800 (1978) (―Statisticians often adopt a 5% rule of 
thumb, rejecting the null hypothesis if the probability of obtaining the sample pass rate 
difference by chance is less than 5%.‖); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 651 
(―Statisticians use the five percent figure most often and refer to it as the ninety-five percent 
level of significance.‖). But see Meier et al., supra note 63, at 151 n.46 (citing William H. 
Kruskal, Significance, Tests of, in  
2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS 944 (William H. Kruskal & Judith A. 
Tanur, eds., 1978) (―[T]here is no professional consensus about the proper use of 
significance levels, or about which level of significance is critical, to claim the law‘s 
particular attention.‖).  The five percent level of significance has also ―been accepted in 
many legal decisions.‖  Gatswirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 176; Scott W. McKinley, 
Comment, The Need for Legislative or Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How 
Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171,  
197–98 (2008) (discussing the .05 and .01 confidence levels as ―cited with approval by 
courts as a proper method of measuring statistical significance‖ (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
 246. Gastwirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 173.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Peresie, supra note 161, at 784. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 155.    
  
statistical significance.‖251  When the sample size is small, there is a greater 
likelihood of false negatives, indicating the absence of discrimination, 
when, in fact, it exists.
252
  On the other hand, the larger the sample size, the 
more it will amplify any difference.
253
  Therefore, ―whereas the four-fifths 
rule could be said to itself have a disparate impact on small employers, the 
statistical significance rule could be said to have a disparate impact on 
large employers because even a small disparity may achieve statistical 
significance.‖254  
As a result of the effect of sample size, the disparate impact provision 
allows courts to choose sides merely by the measure of disparity 
selected.
255
  A small employer has a greater risk of liability under the four-
fifths rule than under a statistical significance test, while a large employer 
                                                 
 251. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206 
(―When samples are very small, large differentials are necessary to obtain statistically 
significant results.‖).  
 252. Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206. 
 253. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 160 (―[L]arge sample sizes will tend to make any 
difference statistically significant.‖).  Researchers caution that one possible consequence of 
the effect of sample size on statistical significance tests is the pressure to resort to quotas.  
Id. at 161.  Professors Meier, Sacks, and Zabell explain that businesses employing large 
numbers inevitably will be liable for disparate impact against a group.  Id.  Such businesses 
will be faced with the choice of expending thousands to validate their selection criteria or 
avoid the costs of validation by opting to use quotas, rather than the selection criteria.  Id. 
(citing Barbara Lerner, Washington v. Davis:  Quantity, Quality and Equality in 
Employment Testing, 1976  
SUP. CT. REV. 263).  For additional discussion about the expense of time and money 
necessary for validation tests, see supra note 152. 
The Court has been sensitive to the potential for disparate impact to lead employers to 
adopt quotas:  ―We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases 
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt prophylactic measures.‖  Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality opinion).  The Watson Court 
opined, ―If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of 
avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be 
widely adopted.‖  Id. at 993.  Ricci reiterated a similar concern:  The ―focus on statistics 
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.‖  
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129  
S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992) (internal quotations omitted).  
But see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring:  Why Disparate Impact 
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996) (arguing that 
the disparate impact provision does not induce quotas).  
 254. Peresie, supra note 161, at 787; see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 
216 (―When few individuals are selected the probability that the protected group might 
claim adverse impact is much higher under the four-fifths rule than under the statistical 
significance rules.  When 200 people are selected, the rules are identical, while for larger 
selections the statistical significance rules are more stringent for the employer than is the 
four-fifths rule.‖); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 393 n.40 (1988) (―For very small 
sample sizes both the 4/5ths rule and a binomial test, based upon approximation to the 
normal distribution, are inadequate measures of discrimination.  In the case of the 4/5ths 
rule, the effect of hiring or failing to hire just one person has a grossly disproportionate 
effect on the determination of discrimination.‖); Shoben, supra note 245, at 809 (describing 
the importance of sample size in determining whether a discrepancy in pass rates is 
significant).   
 255. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789. 
  
faces the opposite risk.  On the other hand, a small sample size causes 
defendants to favor statistical significance and plaintiffs to favor the four-
fifths rule—but as the sample size increases, that preference switches.256  
Applying these results, if a court is pro-defendant, ―it will prefer the four-
fifths rule where the selection rates at issue are high (because a significant 
disparity will not be actionable), but not where the selection rates are 
low.‖257  Thus, whether disparate impact is measured by statistical 
significance tests or the four-fifths rule, the disparate impact provision is 
prone to be overinclusive and underinclusive. 
Another related problem with the four-fifths rule is that it does not assist 
courts in assessing causation. 
258
  Instead, the rule creates a ―high threshold 
(the four-fifths ratio) necessary to establish a disparate impact in order to 
provide for the possibility that other factors are causing the disparity.  But 
this at most indirectly evaluates causation and results in a significant false 
negatives problem.‖259  This criticism affects the efficacy of the disparate 
impact provision in achieving its purpose.  As seen in Parents Involved, the 
limited impact the provision has on attaining its asserted goal undermines 
its ability to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.
260
  
If the disparate impact provision, however, takes into consideration 
sample size and statistical significance, it might avoid the criticism of being 
underinclusive or overinclusive and not causally relevant.  As some 
researchers suggest, ―[t]he 80% rule appears to be a reasonable articulation 
of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant 
differences are substantial enough to warrant legal liability.‖261  The four-
fifths rule appears to allow for the effect of sample size by ―incorporating a 
measure of practical significance.‖262  If researchers Boardman, Vining, 
                                                 
 256. Id.; see also Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 398 (―The error of the four-fifths rule 
also increases as the size of the hiring population increases.  For small numbers of hires the 
four-fifths criterion is actually more demanding on the employer than the binomial test.  For 
large numbers of hires the binomial test is more demanding on the employer.  Thus, in 
comparison to the binomial test, the four-fifths rule will be more likely to find 
discrimination where it does not exist (Type I error) for a small firm, and less likely to find 
discrimination where it does exist (Type II error) for a large firm.‖); Van Bowen & Riggins, 
supra note 45, at 650 (―[T]he four-fifths or eighty per cent rule is not statistically valid and 
should not be used because it does not apply consistently to all employers. . . . The eighty 
percent rule produces different results depending on variables in the percentage of 
minorities in the relevant labor pool and in the number of selections made.‖).  
 257. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789. 
 258. Id. at 791. 
 259. Id. at 791. 
 260. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007) 
(plurality opinion) (explaining the failed policy of using racial classifications to determine 
school assignments for minority students). 
 261. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169. 
 262. Id. at 168.  The four-fifths rule provides as follows:  
Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, 
where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or where a user‘s 
  
Sobol, Ellard, and others took the four-fifths rule‘s allowance for sample 
size into account and if their results are unaffected, then their conclusions 
concerning the disparate impact provision‘s potential for false positive and 
false negative errors might still show that the provision is vulnerable to 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness.  If, however, the four-fifths 
rule‘s allowance for sample size was not considered, it might affect the 
results of the researchers‘ conclusions about false positive and false 
negative errors, and consequently the determination of the reasonableness 
of the disparate impact provision‘s scope.  Thus, whether the provision is 
narrowly tailored in this regard is unsettled. 
C. Exclusion of White Males Would Lead to Underinclusiveness 
The purpose of the disparate impact provision may be frustrated if it 
excludes individuals of a certain racial group from alleging discrimination 
based on race, despite their historical safety from discrimination.  For 
example, the disparate impact provision may be underinclusive if it 
excludes white males from making disparate impact claims.
263
  No 
definitive answer to the question of whether the provision allows for claims 
by white males can be found among the Supreme Court cases involving 
disparate impact because there have not been any white male plaintiffs.
264
  
Additionally, there is no consensus among commentators.
265
   
                                                 
actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or 
ethnic group.  Greater differences in selection rate may not constitute adverse 
impact where the differences are based on small numbers and are not statistically 
significant, or where special recruiting or other programs cause the pool of 
minority or female candidates to be atypical of the normal pool of applicants from 
that group.  Where the user‘s evidence concerning the impact of a selection 
procedure indicates adverse impact but is based upon numbers which are too small 
to be reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a longer period 
of time and/or evidence concerning the impact which the selection procedure had 
when used in the same manner in similar circumstances elsewhere may be 
considered in determining adverse impact.  
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). 
 263. Interestingly, veterans‘ preference is one of the few, if not the only, neutral 
selection device that affords African Americans an advantage over whites.   
See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 368 n.310 (citing Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363  
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff‘d in part, rev‘d in part sub nom., Smith v. Troyan, 520 
F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975)).  In Smith, only thirty-six percent of the white applicants were 
veterans and entitled to a veterans‘ preference compared with the seventy-five percent of 
African American applicants who were veterans and also given the preference.  363 F. 
Supp. at 1146.  The plaintiffs, however, consisted of African Americans and females.  Id. at 
1133. 
 264. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside 
Down?:  Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2004).   
Although Ricci is a Supreme Court case that involved disparate impact, Ricci does not 
provide an answer as to whether the provision protects white males because the white male 
plaintiffs challenged the city‘s action under the disparate treatment provision and the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).  The disparate impact 
  
The arguments against applying the disparate impact provision in favor 
of white males center on the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964 and 1991.
266
  Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers suggest that the 
original intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to protect minorities 
only:  ―Title VII was designed ‗to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.‘‖267   
Additionally, United Steelworks v. Weber
268
 can be interpreted as 
supporting a limitation against extending the disparate impact provision to 
                                                 
issue in Ricci related to whether the city had ―a strong basis in evidence‖ to believe that 
African American firefighters had a disparate impact claim. Id. at 2681.  
While the Supreme Court has yet to address a case involving white males filing disparate 
impact claims, several lower courts have confronted this issue.  See, e.g., Barnhill v. 
Chicago Police Department, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (suit by white-male 
plaintiffs against police department alleging that an examination had a discriminatory 
impact on Caucasians in contravention of Title VII);  Foss v. Thompson, 242 F.3d 1131, 
1134 (9th Cir. 2001)(allegation by white male that the employer‘s requirement that 
applicants have a nursing degree caused a disparate impact on the basis of sex);  Zottola v. 
City of Oakland, 32 F. App‘x 307, 309 (9th Cir. 2002)(involving a claim that the city‘s use 
of oral interviews as part of an examination for hiring firefighters had a disparate impact on 
white males); Sims v. Montgomery County Sheriff‘s Department, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1485–
86 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (claim by white male deputy intervenors that inadequate notice of a 
deadline caused a disparate impact on white males but the court found the claim lacked 
merit); Johnson v. Holley, Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031, 2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 4, 2008)(court recognizing plaintiffs‘ argument that a police department 
promotional examination had a disparate impact on white males). 
These cases do not directly hold that white males are covered by the disparate impact 
provision.  By allowing claims by white males to proceed and addressing the merits of their 
disparate impact claim, however, the courts recognized implicitly that white males fall 
within the protection of the provision.  In all of these cases, none of the defendants argued 
that the disparate impact provision was unavailable to white males, nor did the courts 
hesitate to conduct its analysis on the merits of the disparate impact claim for want of proper 
plaintiffs.  The courts did not dismiss the cases because the plaintiffs were white males and 
ineligible to assert disparate impact claim by virtue of race and sex, but rather the courts 
disposed of these cases for lack of evidence showing a prima facie case of disparate impact.  
These cases are evidence that white males may proceed under the disparate impact theory if 
sufficient evidence exists. 
 265. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1524.  For arguments 
that disparate impact claims are unavailable to white males, see Chamallas, supra note 88, at 
366–68; Kate L. Didech, Note, The Extension of Disparate Impact Theory to White Men:  
What the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Plainly Does not Mean,  
10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 55, 74–75 (2004) For arguments favoring inclusion of white males, 
see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 
523, 558 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1512; Michael L. Zimmer, Individual 
Disparate Impact Law:  On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,  
30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 501–02 (1999).  
 266. See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 367 (arguing that Congress ―was concerned with 
improving the economic status of blacks‖); Didech, supra note 265, at 74 (arguing that 
extending disparate impact theory to white men is ―not within the statute‘s spirit and the 
intention of its makers‖); John J. Donahue III, Comment, Understanding the Reasons for 
and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 
898 (2001).   
 267. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int‘l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 
(1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–03 (1971)). 
 268. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
  
protect white males.
269
  In Weber, the Court concluded that ―Congress‘ 
primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‗the plight of the Negro 
in our economy.‘‖270  The Weber Court decided that ―it was clear to 
Congress that ‗[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment 
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally 
closed to them,‘ and it was to this problem that Title VII‘s prohibition 
against racial discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.‖271   
Finally, the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could 
support a similar interpretation.  Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
adopted the definitions of business necessity and job relatedness from 
Griggs,
272
 it codified the theory of disparate impact along with the Court‘s 
interpreted limitations.
273
   
There are, however, problems with the theory that white males cannot 
avail themselves of the disparate impact provision.  While the language of 
Griggs suggests a limitation against white males, McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transportation Co.,
274
 Bakke, and Teal support allowing disparate 
impact claims by white males.  McDonald involved a claim of 
discrimination by a white male who was discharged by his employer and 
addressed whether Title VII covered intentional discrimination against 
white employees.
275
  Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, 
declared:  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of ―any 
individual‖ because of ―such individual‘s race.‖  Its terms are not limited 
to discrimination against members of any particular race. . . . This 
conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the 
effect that Title VII was intended to ―cover white men and white women 
and all Americans‖ and create an ―obligation not to discriminate against 
whites.‖  We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial 
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same 
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson 
white.
276
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Although McDonald did not raise a disparate impact claim, the Court‘s 
holding suggests that Title VII is universally available. 
Bakke also buttresses an inclusive interpretation of the disparate impact 
provision to encompass white males.  In Bakke, the medical school argued 
that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny because the plaintiff, a white 
male, is not among a ―discrete and insular minority‖ group that is afforded 
heightened protection.
277
  The Court unequivocally declared that ―[r]acial 
and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination 
without regard to these additional characteristics.‖278  The Court explained, 
―[a]lthough many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived 
of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of 
the Negro race and the white ‗majority,‘ the Amendment itself was framed 
in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of 
prior servitude.‖279   
Similarly, although Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
1991 with the vision of bringing equality to African Americans,
280
 the 
disparate impact provision, too, was framed in universal terms.  As Bakke 
demonstrated, the universal language of an act prevails over Congressional 
intent.
281
  Therefore, because the disparate impact provision was written in 
universal terms, the provision also affords white males protection. 
Additionally, Teal‘s individual-centered approach also supports an 
expansive interpretation of the disparate impact provision.  In Teal, the 
plaintiffs filed a disparate impact claim because an employment test that 
was required for promotion had an adverse effect on African Americans.
282
  
The employer asserted a ―bottom-line‖ theory of defense, arguing that the 
employer should not be liable for disparate impact caused by the test if the 
bottom-line outcome of the promotional process achieved racial balance.
283
   
Teal rejected the bottom-line defense because Title VII‘s principle of 
equality centered on the individual, not groups.
284
  The Court concluded, 
―Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out 
‗artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary‘ employer-created barriers to 
professional development that have a discriminatory impact upon 
individuals.‖285  If, as interpreted by Teal, the disparate impact provision‘s 
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purpose is to protect individuals, not groups, then the provision should not 
exclude an entire class of individuals—white males.286   
Arguably, Teal‘s individual-centered approach can be construed to 
restrict white males from asserting a disparate impact claim.  It is possible 
that while Teal interpreted Title VII as securing protection for 
individuals,
287
 it intended to address only minorities.  In Teal, the Court 
stated, ―[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at 
the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these individual 
respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the 
basis of job-related criteria.‖288  Teal‘s reference to ―white workers‖ may 
have the same limiting effect as Griggs‘s reference to ―white employees‖289 
as previously discussed.
290
   
But this argument may be less persuasive in light of the context of Teal 
and Griggs.  It is important to recognize that Teal and the other Supreme 
Court cases containing language that suggests the unavailability of 
disparate impact claims for white males all involved minority and female 
plaintiffs.
291
  Also, although Weber and Sheet Metal Workers involved 
white plaintiffs, they did not directly assert a disparate impact claim.
292
  
Ultimately, even if the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 
and 1991 did not extend protection to white males, precluding white males 
from asserting a disparate impact claim would raise an obvious equal 
protection challenge.  Such a restrictive interpretation of the disparate 
impact provision would be contrary to our current notions of what is 
emblematic of the Equal Protection Clause.
293
  The exclusion of white 
males from the protection of the provision would, in and of itself, involve a 
classification resulting in unequal application of the provision, which 
would trigger strict scrutiny and require a compelling interest to justify this 
exclusion.   
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Additionally, regardless of the asserted compelling interest, for example, 
smoking out discrimination, providing role models, attaining the benefits of 
diversity, meeting operational needs, or removing barriers to equal 
employment opportunities,
294
 excluding white males from asserting a 
disparate impact claim would render the provision underinclusive in 
meeting any one of these interests.  For example, if the disparate impact 
provision‘s racial classification was intended to attain the benefits of 
diversity, excluding white males from the provision‘s coverage would 
hamper the furtherance of fostering cross-racial understanding and problem 
solving.
295
  Consider another example.  If the compelling interest 
underlying the provision‘s racial classification rested on removing barriers 
to equal employment opportunities, that goal would be more effectively 
achieved if it allowed white males to sue for disparate impact.  
In light of the potential Equal Protection Clause violation that a 
restrictive interpretation of the disparate impact provision would raise, the 
rules of statutory construction would necessitate that white males be 
included.  The Court has operated under the principle that it will construe a 
statute in a manner that avoids declaring an act invalid if it is fairly possible 
to do so.
296
  Reliance on the plain language of the statute provides an 
expansive interpretation of the provision and would allow the Court to 
fairly avoid invalidating the provision for failing to include white males.   
VI. DURATION 
For the disparate impact provision to pass strict scrutiny, it must also be 
narrowly tailored in duration.
297
  Duration is a critical factor in evaluating 
whether a program is narrowly tailored because the Court has established 
that ―all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.‖298  As the 
Court has explained, ―[t]his requirement reflects that racial classifications, 
however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may 
be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.  Enshrining a 
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permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this 
fundamental equal protection principle.‖299 
A durational requirement has been applied in remedial programs in order 
to ensure that a program intended to remedy past discrimination is not 
being used simply to achieve and maintain racial balance.
300
  In Croson, the 
Court required findings not only to support a remedial need but also ―to 
assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all 
racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the 
service of the goal of equality itself.‖301 Therefore, although the Court 
ultimately held that the city lacked a remedial purpose, it envisioned 
remedial programs as temporary devices.
302
 
Additionally, Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers support requiring a 
durational limit for race-conscious programs, as evidenced by the Court‘s 
conclusions that the challenged programs were narrowly tailored because 
they were temporary.
303
  The Court described the membership goal in Sheet 
Metal Workers as a ―temporary measure[]‖ that would end when the 
percentage of minorities in the local work force was reflected in the 
percentage of minorities in the union.
304
  The Court concluded that the 
membership goal ―operate[d] as a temporary tool for remedying past 
discrimination without attempting to maintain a previously achieved 
balance.‖305   
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Likewise, the Court determined that the quota in Paradise was 
―ephemeral‖ because ―the term of its application [was] contingent upon the 
Department‘s own conduct,‖306 and explained that the fifty percent quota 
was ―not itself the goal; rather it represent[ed] the speed at which the goal 
of 25% [would] be achieved.‖307  The Court analogized the goal in 
Paradise to the end date imposed in Sheet Metal Workers:  ―In these 
circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of 50% minority 
promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet Metal Workers, was crafted 
and applied flexibly, was constitutionally permissible.‖308  
In circumstances where the compelling interest is something other than 
remedial, the Court has been equally insistent on time limits.  Grutter is 
one example.  Because the race-conscious program in Grutter was upheld 
on a compelling interest of achieving diversity and attaining its benefits, 
rather than on remedial grounds, one would not expect a durational limit on 
diversity.
309
  On the other hand, one might expect a time limit for remedial 
programs because once the discrimination has been remedied, assuming 
that it can be reliably and readily ascertained, the program may no longer 
be necessary.  Remedial programs seek to redress a ―particular quantum of 
harm‖ with ―clearer, more finite endpoints.‖310   
Setting a durational limit on diversity, however, may be incongruous 
because it would amount to setting an ―expiration date‖ on diversity.311  
Diversity is not temporal by nature.
312
  As Professor Robert Post explains, 
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―[i]f diversity is necessary in order to train competent professionals, for 
example, it is necessary at any and all times; there is no intrinsic time 
horizon when this need for diversity will disappear.‖313   
Nonetheless, the Grutter Court refused to exempt the admissions 
program from durational limits,
314
 which the Court contemplated could be 
satisfied by sunset provisions and periodic reviews of the program to assess 
its necessity.
315
  Consequently, Justice O‘Connor anticipated the following:  
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to 
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of higher 
education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the [diversity] 
interest . . . .
316
 
In light of the above cases, regardless of the type of compelling interest 
that might justify the disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications, the 
provision must have a durational limit.  Arguably, the provision‘s four-
fifths rule can be construed as an end date like the twenty-five percent goal 
in Paradise and twenty-nine percent goal in Sheet Metal Workers.
317
  
Under this argument, the four-fifths rule sets the pace at which the goal will 
be met.   
One notable difference, however, is that enforcement of the goals in 
Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers ceased once the remedial goals were 
achieved, thereby ensuring the goals‘ temporary status.318  In contrast, even 
if the disparate impact provision serves a remedial need like that found in 
Paradise or Sheet Metal Workers, the four-fifths rule will not be lifted for 
the employer who has met the four-fifths or eighty percent proportion.
319
  
The four-fifths rule continues to be enforced for every aspect of a 
business‘s operation and, therefore, is not likely temporary.320 In effect, the 
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four-fifths rule seeks to maintain a balanced work force, contrary to the 
Court‘s prohibition, not merely to attain one.321  
If the four-fifths rule is not itself a time limit, then a limit must be set for 
the disparate impact provision.  Because Justice O‘Connor contemplated a 
durational limit for diversity, a similar limit could be imposed for the 
disparate impact provision if its intended purpose is diversity.  There is, 
however, some lack of clarity with Justice O‘Connor‘s statement.  First, it 
is not clear whether Justice O‘Connor contemplated a twenty-five year 
durational limit or a fifty year limit because of her reference to Justice 
Powell‘s approval of diversity in Bakke, which occurred twenty-five years 
before Grutter.
322
  Second, it is unclear whether Justice O‘Connor would 
expect a similar limit for race-conscious programs designed to advance 
other non-remedial interests, like providing role models, meeting 
occupational needs, and providing equal employment opportunities.   
Assuming that Justice O‘Connor‘s expectation also applies to non-
remedial goals, it is necessary to assess whether the disparate impact 
provision complies with the twenty-five year or fifty year durational limit.  
In the circumstance of race-conscious admissions programs, a school‘s 
compliance with the durational limit set by Justice O‘Connor could easily 
be determined from the date of an admissions program‘s application.  For 
the disparate impact provision, there are three ways to measure its 
compliance with Justice O‘Connor‘s durational limit:  using the year when 
the Court adopted the disparate impact theory, when the EEOC established 
the four-fifths rule, or when Congress promulgated the disparate impact 
provision.   
If one measures the disparate impact provision‘s compliance with the 
time limit from the year the Court began applying the disparate impact 
theory in Griggs (1971),
323
 the provision has exceeded Justice O‘Connor‘s 
twenty-five year durational limit.  Similarly, if one uses the four-fifths 
rule‘s passage date (1978),324 the provision again would fail the twenty-five 
year durational limit.  If, however, one uses the year of the provision‘s 
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congressional passage (1991),
325
 the provision would be in compliance 
until the year 2016.  If one applies the fifty year durational limit, the 
disparate impact provision would be in compliance regardless of the 
method of measurement. 
VII. NECESSITY AND RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES  
A. The Importance of Race-Neutral Alternatives 
To demonstrate that the use of racial classifications is necessary, the 
government must show the unavailability or ineffectiveness of race-neutral 
alternatives to achieve its goal.
326
  Croson required the government to 
exhaust race-neutral alternatives before resorting to racial classifications.
327
  
In Croson, the city failed to consider any race-neutral alternatives.
328
  It 
seemed logical to the Court that the city should have investigated race-
neutral alternatives because the city cited many race neutral barriers to 
minority participation.  The Court suggested race-neutral alternatives, such 
as city financing for small firms if Minority Business Enterprises 
disproportionately lacked capital,
329
 ―increas[ing] the accessibility of city 
contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races[,]‖ and also 
―[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding 
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs of all races.‖330 
Although Grutter did ―not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative,‖331 it held that ―[n]arrow tailoring does, however, 
require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives.‖332  Later in Parents Involved, the plurality reiterated Grutter‘s 
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requirement to examine race-neutral alternatives and criticized the districts 
for failing to make such considerations.
333
  
In contrast, the programs in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise were 
narrowly tailored because there were no other alternatives to the race-
conscious programs.  In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court approved of 
―stronger measures‖ because the district court had already considered 
alternative remedies in light of the union‘s deliberate delays in carrying out 
the district court‘s initial remedial order.334  Because of similar ―foot 
dragging‖ in Paradise, the Court also found that the lower court adequately 
considered other alternatives.
335
  In both Paradise and Sheet Metal 
Workers, the proposed alternatives fell short of addressing the long term, 
pervasive discrimination caused by the government.
336
  Thus, when the 
government uses racial classifications, it must at least show it has 
considered race-neutral alternatives.   
B. Race-Neutral Alternatives for the Disparate Impact Provision‘s Racial 
Classifications 
The disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications may not be 
narrowly tailored if there are neutral alternatives available.  Consideration 
of the availability of neutral alternatives depends on the compelling 
purpose for the provision‘s use of race.  If the provision is intended to 
remedy past discrimination, there are possible alternatives to explore such 
as providing preparatory testing materials,
337
 training,
338
 or financial aid.
339
  
If the compelling purpose of the provision is to increase diversity or 
provide equal opportunities, those same alternatives could be explored.  
Additionally, sensitivity training could be provided to promote the cross-
racial understanding that is believed to derive from diversity.
340
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Perhaps the one compelling interest where there is no available race-
neutral alternative is meeting an operational need.  An employer is most 
likely to show the unavailability of race-neutral alternatives when race-
conscious decisions are made for authenticity, such as conducting 
investigations to infiltrate a racial gang, as Justice Stevens has 
contemplated.
341
  
This discussion is not meant to suggest that there are easy cures for the 
ills that the disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications are meant to 
address.  But there must be evidence that the government has considered 
alternatives before imposing the provision‘s racial classifications on 
employers.  
VIII. THE SURVIVAL OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION  
The survival of the disparate impact provision against an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge rests upon whether the provision‘s use of racial 
classifications functions like rigid quotas, is flexible and affords 
individualized decisions, is overinclusive or underinclusive, is temporary in 
duration, and is necessary in light of good faith considerations of race-
neutral alternatives.  The disparate impact provision fails the narrow 
tailoring requirement under all these criteria. 
 The provision‘s four-fifths rule risks being labeled a quota.  Legislative 
history reveals that the predominant concern with the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which codified disparate impact and its predecessor, was this very 
issue of the Act being a ―quota bill.‖342  The analysis in this Article does 
not rely on those generalized fears expressed during the passage of the Act 
but rather on the functionality of the four-fifths rule that was overlooked 
during the two years of debates preceding the Act.  It is difficult to 
distinguish the four-fifths rule from a quota because it effectively insulates 
a percentage of applicants from competition and uses race as the only 
factor in determining prima facie violations, which is antithetical to the 
characteristics of the permissible goal in Grutter.  
If the disparate impact provision is a quota, it will naturally fail the 
requirement for flexibility or individualized decisions that the Court has 
favored as permissible goals.  The provision lacks the flexibility of the 
goals in Grutter, Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, and Harvard‘s program 
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that was endorsed by Bakke.  The provision, specifically the four-fifths 
rule, does not fluctuate with the needs of the employer or the compelling 
interest sought to be achieved by the provision.  Whether the objective of 
the provision is to remedy past discrimination, smoke out discrimination, 
increase diversity, provide role models, meet an operational need, or 
eliminate unnecessary and arbitrary barriers to employment, the four-fifths 
rule is constant.   
The provision‘s inflexibility affects its ability to provide the type of 
individualized decisions that were critical in the Court‘s approval of 
Grutter and invalidation of Gratz.  Whether a plaintiff has a prima facie 
case of disparate impact against an employer is determined on the basis of 
race alone and does not include a ―holistic‖ review of the case.  
Additionally, the provision is not narrowly tailored in duration or scope.  
Regardless of the compelling interest that may justify racial classifications, 
the Court has insisted that such classifications be temporary.  The disparate 
impact provision does not provide sunset provisions or indicate ―a logical 
stopping point.‖   
The provision‘s four-fifths rule also potentially suffers from being 
overinclusive and underinclusive, which affects evaluation of its scope.  
Assuming that researchers took into consideration the four-fifths rule‘s 
allowance for sample size and statistical significance, the rule‘s 
susceptibility to false positive and false negative errors could lead to under-
enforcement of the provision when an adverse impact exists and over-
enforcement when an adverse impact does not exist.  Governmental racial 
classifications that are overinclusive or underinclusive undermine the 
necessity of the classifications and suggest that other alternatives are 
available.  
Finally, the provision‘s racial classifications must be necessary to 
achieving its compelling interest, which depends on consideration of race-
neutral alternatives.  Of the six compelling interests identified earlier, only 
in one circumstance would the provision‘s racial classifications be 
necessary to achieve its objective.  If there is a compelling need to use 
racial classifications for authenticity such as for investigative purposes, 
race-neutral alternatives would not be available.  The availability of race-
neutral alternatives for the other possible compelling interests would negate 
the disparate impact provision‘s justified reliance upon racial 
classifications.  
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia warned in Ricci that ―the war between disparate impact 
and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to 
begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between 
  
them.‖343  The purpose of this Article has been to analyze the disparate 
impact provision under the doctrinal demands of strict scrutiny and equal 
protection to determine if peace is possible, rather than to predict the 
outcome of future cases or make normative arguments.   
In my earlier work, I explored the compelling interests that might justify 
the disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications.   
I preliminarily concluded that the removal of barriers to achieve equal 
employment opportunities is the most promising compelling interest that 
might bring peace between the disparate impact provision and the Equal 
Protection Clause.
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  This Article completes the analysis necessary to 
answer the question posed by Justice Scalia by addressing the second prong 
of strict scrutiny—narrow tailoring.  While remedying past discrimination, 
smoking out discrimination, enhancing diversity, providing role models, 
satisfying operational need, and providing equal employment opportunities 
may be laudable goals, the disparate impact provision‘s means of achieving 
them are inadequate to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.  An 
inability to show that the disparate impact provision‘s means fit its ends 
may, in fact, be fatal when ―the evil day‖ comes.  
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